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A system with sporadic errors (SSE) is a controller which produces high quality output but it may
occasionally violate a critical requirement REQ(I,O). A run-time enforcement shield is a controller
which takes (I,O) (coming from SSE) as its input, and it produces a corrected outputO′ which guar-
antees the invariance of requirement REQ(I,O′). Moreover, the output sequence O′ must deviate
from O “as little as possible” to maintain the quality. In this paper, we give a method for logical
specification of shields using formulas of logic Quantified Discrete Duration Calculus(QDDC). The
specification consists of a correctness requirement REQ as well as a hard deviation constraint HDC
which must both be mandatorily and invariantly satisfied by the shield. Moreover, we also use quan-
titative optimization to give a shield which minimizes the expected value of cumulative deviation in
an H-optimal fashion. We show how tool DCSynth implementing soft requirement guided synthesis
can be used for automatic synthesis of shields from a given specification. Next, we give logical for-
mulas specifying several notions of shields including the k-Stabilizing shield of Bloem et al. [2, 9]
as well as the Burst-error shield of Wu et al. [21], and a new e,d-shield. Shields can be automati-
cally synthesized for all these specifications using the tool DCSynth. We give experimental results
showing the performance of our shield synthesis tool in relation to previous work. We also compare
the performance of the shields synthesized under diverse hard deviation constraints in terms of their
expected deviation and the worst case burst-deviation latency.
1 Introduction
A system with sporadic errors (SSE) is a controller which produces high quality desirable output for
any given input but it may sporadically violate a critical system requirement REQ(I,O), where I and O
are the set of input and output propositions. Many manually designed controllers have this character, as
they embody designer’s unspecified optimizations, however they may have obscure design errors. A run-
time enforcement shield for a specified critical requirement REQ(I,O) is a controller (Mealy machine)
which receives both input and output (I,O) generated by SSE. The shield produces a modified output
O′ which is guaranteed to invariantly meet the critical requirement REQ(I,O′) (correct-by-construction).
Moreover, in each run, the shield output O′ must deviate from the SSE output O “as little as possible”,
to maintain the quality. This allows the shield to benefit from system designer’s optimizations without
having to formally specify these or to handle these in the synthesis. See Figure 2.
A central issue in designing run-time enforcement shields is the underlying notion of “deviating as
little as possible” from the SSE output. There are several different notions explored in the literature
[2, 9, 21, 20]. In their pioneering paper, Bloem et al. [2] proposed the notion of k-stabilizing shield
which may deviate for at most k cycles continuously under suitable assumptions. If assumptions are not
met the shield may deviate arbitrarily. This was proposed as a hard requirement which must be manda-
torily satisfied by the shield in any behaviour. We call such constraints as hard deviation constraints.
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Konighofer et al [9] have proposed some variants of the k-stabilizing shield requirement with and with-
out fail safe state, which are also hard deviation constraints. Specific shield synthesis algorithms have
been developed for each of these constraints.
As our first main contribution, we propose a logical specification notation for hard deviation con-
straints using the formulas of an interval temporal logic QDDC. This logic allows us to succinctly and
modularly specify regular properties [13, 11, 12]. With its counting constructs and interval based modal-
ities, it can be used to conveniently specify both the correctness requirement REQ(I,O) as well as the
hard deviation constraint HDC.
Criticizing the inability of k-stabilizing shields in handling burst errors, Wu et al. [21, 20] proposed a
burst-error shield which enforces the invariance of the correctness requirement, and it locally minimizes
the measure of deviation between SSE output O and the shield output O′, at each step. An algorithm for
the synthesis of such shields was given. We call such a shield as locally deviation minimizing.
In this paper, as our second main contribution, we generalize the Wu technique to minimize the cu-
mulative deviation more globally. AnH-optimal shield which minimizes at each point the expected value
of cumulative deviation in next H-steps of shield execution is computed. The cumulative deviation is av-
eraged over all possible H length inputs to arrive at the optimal estimate. A well known value iteration
algorithm [1, 16] for optimal policy synthesis of Markov Decision Processes allows us to compute such
a shield. We call such a shield as H-optimally deviation minimizing. This is a powerful optimization and
in the paper we experimentally show its significant impact on performance of the shield. It may be noted
that Wu’s burst-error shield is obtained by selecting H = 0.
Finally, we propose a uniform method for synthesizing a run-time enforcement shield from given
logical specification (REQ,HDC) and a horizon value (natural number) H . The resulting shield invari-
antly meets the correctness requirement REQ as well as the hard deviation constraint HDC. Moreover,
the shield is H-optimally deviation minimizing. The shield synthesis is carried out by using the soft
requirement guided controller synthesis tool DCSynth [18]. This tool allows synthesis of H-optimal
controllers from specified hard and soft QDDC requirements.
Using the proposed formalism, in the paper, we formulate several diverse notions of shields. These
include a logical specification of Bloem’s k-stabilizing shield and Wu’s burst-error shield, as well as
a new notion of e,d-shield. A uniform synthesis method using the tool DCSynth can be applied to
obtain the corresponding run-time enforcement shields. It is notable that tool DCSynth uses an efficient
BDD-based semi-symbolic representation of automata/controllers with aggressive minimization. This
allows the tool to scale better and to produce smaller sized shields. In the paper, we give an experimental
evaluation of the performance of our DCSynth tool and compare it with some previously reported studies
in the literature.
With the ability to formulate shields with diverse hard deviation constraints, it is natural to ask for a
comparison of the performance of these shields. The performance must essentially measure the extent
of deviation of the shield output from the SSE output. Towards this, we propose two measures of the
shield performance.
• We compute the probability of deviation in long run. For this, we assume that the input to the
shield is fully random, with each input variable value chosen independently of the past and each
other. While simplistic, this does provide some indication of the shield’s effectiveness in average.
• We measure the worst case burst-deviation latency. This gives the maximum number of con-
secutive deviations possible in the worst case. (If unbounded, we report ∞). A model checking
technique implemented in a tool CTLDC [14] allows us to compute this worst case latency.
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Tool DCSynth provides facilities for the computation of each of these performance measures for a syn-
thesized shield. The reader may refer to the original papers on DCSynth [18, 15] for details of techniques
by which such performance can be measured. In this paper, we synthesize shields with different hard
deviation constraints and we provide a comparison of the performance of these shields. This allows us to
draw some preliminary conclusions. Clearly, much wider experimentation is needed for firmer insight.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 describes the syntax and semantics of the
logic QDDC. Section 2.3 gives the syntax of DCSynth specification and brief outline of the synthesis
method. Section 3 describes the various logical notions of shield specification. Section 4 describes
metrics to evaluate the shield performance and corresponding experimental results. In Section 5, we
conclude the paper with discussion and related work.
2 Preliminaries
We provide a brief overview of logic QDDC as well as the soft requirement guided H-optimal controller
synthesis method implemented in tool DCSynth. This method and tool is applied to the problem of
run-time enforcement shield synthesis in this paper. The reader may refer to the original paper [18] for
further details of these preliminaries.
2.1 Quantified Discrete Duration Calculus (QDDC) Logic
Let PV be a finite non-empty set of propositional variables. Let σ a non-empty finite word over the
alphabet 2PV . It has the form σ = P0 · · ·Pn where Pi ⊆ PV for each i ∈ {0, . . . ,n}. Let len(σ) = n+ 1,
dom(σ) = {0, . . . ,n}, σ [i, j] = Pi · · ·Pj and σ [i] = Pi.
The syntax of a propositional formula over variables PV is given by:
ϕ := f alse | true | p ∈ PV | !ϕ | ϕ && ϕ | ϕ || ϕ
with &&, ||, ! denoting conjunction, dis-junction and negation, respectively. Operators such as ⇒ and
⇔ are defined as usual. Let Ω(PV ) be the set of all propositional formulas over variables PV . Let
i ∈ dom(σ). Then the satisfaction of propositional formula ϕ at point i, denoted σ , i |= ϕ is defined as
usual and omitted here for brevity.
The syntax of a QDDC formula over variables PV is given by:
D := 〈ϕ〉 | [ϕ ] | [[ϕ ]] | D ^ D | !D | D || D | D && D
ex p. D | all p. D | slen ⊲⊳ c | scount ϕ ⊲⊳ c | sdur ϕ ⊲⊳ c
where ϕ ∈Ω(PV ), p ∈ PV , c ∈ N and ⊲⊳∈ {<,≤,=,≥,>}.
An interval over a word σ is of the form [b,e] where b,e ∈ dom(σ) and b≤ e. Let Intv(σ) be the set
of all intervals over σ . Let σ be a word over 2PV , let [b,e] ∈ Intv(σ) be an interval. Then the satisfaction
of a QDDC formula D written as σ , [b,e] |= D, is defined inductively as follows:
σ , [b,e] |= 〈ϕ〉 iff b= e and σ ,b |= ϕ ,
σ , [b,e] |= [ϕ ] iff b< e and ∀b≤ i< e : σ , i |= ϕ ,
σ , [b,e] |= [[ϕ ]] iff ∀b≤ i≤ e : σ , i |= ϕ ,
σ , [b,e] |=D1^D2 iff ∃b≤ i≤ e : σ , [b, i] |= D1 and σ , [i,e] |= D2,
with Boolean combinations !D, D1 || D2 and D1 && D2 defined in the expected way. We call word
σ ′ a p-variant, p ∈ PV , of a word σ if ∀i ∈ dom(σ),∀q 6= p : q ∈ σ ′[i]⇔ q ∈ σ [i]. Then σ , [b,e] |=
ex p. D iff σ ′, [b,e] |= D for some p-variant σ ′ of σ ; and (all p. D)⇔ (!ex p. !D).
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Position 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
r 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
p 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
q 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
φuntil(3) 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
Figure 1: Example behaviour for φuntil(3)
Entities slen , scount and sdur are called terms. The term slen gives the length of the interval in
which it is measured. Term scount ϕ , where ϕ ∈ Ω(PV ), counts the number of positions including the
first and the last point in the interval under consideration where ϕ holds. Formally, for ϕ ∈ Ω(PV ) we
have slen(σ , [b,e]) = e−b, and scount(σ ,ϕ , [b,e]) = ∑i=ei=b
{
1, if σ , i |= ϕ ,
0, otherwise.
}
.
We also define the following derived constructs: pt = 〈true〉, ext =!pt, 〈〉D = true^D^true, []D =
(!〈〉!D) and pre f (D) =!((!D)^true). Thus, σ , [b,e] |= []D iff σ , [b′,e′] |= D for all sub-intervals b ≤
b′ ≤ e′ ≤ e and σ , [b,e] |= pref (D) iff σ , [b,e′] |= D for all prefix intervals b≤ e′ ≤ e.
Finally, we define σ , i |= D iff σ , [0, i] |= D, and σ |= D iff σ , [0, len(σ)−1] |= D. Let L(D) = {σ |
σ |=D}, the set of behaviours accepted by D. Let D be valid, denoted |=dc D, iff L(D) = (2
PV )+. Notice
that σ , i |= D denotes that the past of position i satisfies the formula D.
Example 1. We give an example QDDC formula over propositions {p,q,r} which specifies a typical
recurrent reach-avoid behaviour required in many control systems. Intuitively, the formula ϕuntil(n)
holds at a position i in the behaviour if, since the previous occurrence of r, the proposition p persists
till an occurrence of q. Moreover, q must occur within n time units from the last occurrence of r. For
example, here r may denote entering of enemy air-space, p may denote that the UAV is invisible and q
may denote that the target is reached. Let ϕ3 abbreviate ϕuntil(3). Figure 1 gives a possible behaviour σ
where the last row gives the value of σ , i |= ϕ3 for each position i.
• Until(p,q,n): ((slen<(n)) && [[p]]) ||
(((([p] || pt)^<q>) && slen<=n)^true).
The second disjunct holds for an interval [b,e] provided q occurs at a position b ≤ j ≤ e with
j ≤ b+n and p persists from b to j−1. E.g. in Figure 1, σ , [5,9] |= until(p,q,3) with j = 8. The
first disjunct holds for an interval [b,e] provided e− b < n and p holds throughout the interval.
E.g. σ , [11,12] |= until(p,q,3). Note that σ , [2,4] 6|= until(p,q,3).
• SinceLast(p,D): !(true^(<p>^((slen=1^[[!p]]) || pt) && !(D)))
This formula fails to hold at position i provided there is a previous (last) occurrence of p in the
past of i, at say position j ≤ i, and D does not hold for the interval [ j, i].
• Let ϕuntil(n) be the QDDC formula SinceLast(r,(Until(p,q,n))).
Then, σ ,1 |= ϕ3 since there is no r at any position j ≤ 1. Also, σ ,9 |= ϕ3 as, since the previous
occurrence of r at position 5, the proposition p persists till 7 and q holds at 8 (with 8 ≤ 5+ 3).
Note also that σ ,12 |= ϕ3 since the previous r occurs at 12 (with 12 < 12+ 3) and σ , [12,12] |=
[[ p ]]. Finally, σ ,4 6|= ϕ3 as, since the previous r at position 4, neither does q occur in-between
nor do we have σ , [2,4] |= [[ p ]].
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Theorem 2. [13] For every formula D over variables PV we can construct a Deterministic Finite Au-
tomaton (DFA) A (D) over alphabet 2PV such that L(A (D)) = L(D). We call A (D) a formula automa-
ton for D or the monitor automaton for D.
A tool DCVALID implements this formula automaton construction in an efficient manner by inter-
nally using the tool MONA [8]. It gives minimal, deterministic automaton (DFA) for the formula D. We
omit the details here. However, the reader may refer to several papers on QDDC for detailed description
and examples of QDDC specifications as well as its model checking tool DCVALID [13, 11, 12].
In the rest of the paper we consider QDDC formulas and automata where variables PV = I ∪O are
partitioned into disjoint sets of input variables I and output variables O. Such a formula/automaton
specifies a relation between inputs and outputs.
For technical convenience, we define a notion of indicator variable for a QDDC formula (regular
property). The idea is that the indicator variable w witnesses the truth of a formula D at any point in
execution. Thus, Ind(D,w) = pre f (EP(w)⇔ D). Here, EP(w) = (true^〈w〉), i.e. in a behaviour σ and
a position i, we have σ , i |= EP(w) iff w ∈ σ [i]. If σ |= Ind(D,w) then for for any i, we have σ , i |= D
iff w ∈ σ [i]. Thus variable w is true exactly at those positions where the past of the position satisfies D.
These indicator variables can be used as auxiliary propositions in another formula using the notion of
cascade composition≪ defined below.
Definition 3 (Cascade Composition). Let D1, . . . ,Dk be QDDC formulas over input-output variables
(I,O) and letW = {w1, . . . ,wk} be the corresponding set of fresh indicator variables i.e. (I∪O)∩W = /0.
Let D be a formula over variables (I ∪O∪W ). Then, the cascade composition ≪ and its equivalent
QDDC formula are as follows:
D≪ 〈Ind(D1,w1), . . . , Ind(Dk,wk)〉 = D∧
∧
1≤i≤k
pre f (EP(wi)⇔ Di)
This composition gives a formula over input-output variables (I,O∪W).
Cascade composition provides a useful ability to modularize a formula using auxiliary propositions
W which witness other regular properties given as QDDC formulas.
Example 4. Consider a formula D= (scount dev <= 3) which holds at a point provided the proposi-
tion dev is true at most 3 times in the entire past. Let formula D1= (true^<o 6= o’>) which holds at a
point provided that the values of propositions o and o’ differ at that position. Then, D≪ Ind(D1,dev)
is equivalent to the formula (scount dev <= 3) && pref(EP(dev) <=> D1). This formula holds
at a position i, provided D1 holds at most 3 time in the interval [0,i]. That is o 6=o’ for at-most 3
positions in the interval [0,i].
2.2 Supervisors and Controllers
Now we consider QDDC formulas and automata where variables PV = I∪O are partitioned into disjoint
sets of input variables I and output variables O. We show how Mealy machines can be represented as
special form of Deterministic finite automata (DFA). Supervisors and controllers are Mealy machines
with special properties. This representation allows us to use the MONA DFA library [8] to efficiently
compute supervisors and controllers in our tool DCSynth.
Definition 5 (Output-nondeterministic Mealy Machines). A total and Deterministic Finite Automaton
(DFA) over input-output alphabet Σ = 2I × 2O is a tuple A = (Q,Σ,s,δ ,F), as usual, with δ : Q× 2I×
2O→Q. An output-nondeterministic Mealy machine is a DFA with a unique reject (or non-final) state
r which is a sink state i.e. F = Q−{r} and δ (r, i,o) = r for all i ∈ 2I , o ∈ 2O.
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Intuition is that the transitions from q∈F to r are forbidden (and kept only for making the DFA total).
Language of any such Mealy machine is prefix-closed. Recall that for a Mealy machine, F = Q−{r}.
A Mealy machine is deterministic if ∀s ∈ F , ∀i ∈ 2I , ∃ at most one o ∈ 2O s.t. δ (s, i,o) 6= r. An output-
nondeterministic Mealy machine is called non-blocking if ∀s ∈ F , ∀i ∈ 2I ∃o ∈ 2I s.t. δ (s, i,o) ∈ F .
It follows that for all input sequences a non-blocking Mealy machine can produce one or more output
sequence without ever getting into the reject state.
For a Mealy machine M over variables (I,O), its language L(M) ⊆ (2I × 2O)∗. A word σ ∈ L(M)
can also be represented as pair (ii,oo) ∈ ((2I)∗,(2O)∗) such that σ [k] = ii[k]∪oo[k],∀k ∈ dom(σ). Here
σ , ii,oo must have the same length. We will not distinguish between σ and (ii,oo) in the rest of the
paper. Also, for any input sequence ii ∈ (2I)∗, we will define M[ii] = {oo | (ii,oo) ∈ L(M)}.
Definition 6 (Controllers and Supervisors). An output-nondeterministic Mealy machine which is non-
blocking is called a supervisor. A deterministic supervisor is called a controller.
The non-deterministic choice of outputs in a supervisor denotes unresolved decision. The determin-
ism ordering below allows supervisors to be refined into controllers.
Definition 7 (Determinism Order and Sub-supervisor). Given two supervisors Sup1,Sup2 we say that
Sup2 is more deterministic than Sup1, denoted Sup1 ≤det Sup2, iff L(Sup2)⊆ L(Sup1). We call Sup2 to
be a sub-supervisor of Sup1.
Note that being supervisors, they are both non-blocking, and hence /0 ⊂ Sup2[ii] ⊆ Sup1[ii] for any
ii ∈ (2I)∗. The supervisor Sup2 may make use of additional memory for resolving and pruning the
non-determinism in Sup1.
2.3 DCSynth Specification and Controller Synthesis
This section gives a brief overview of the soft requirement guided controller synthesis method from
QDDC formulas. The method is implemented in a tool DCSynth. (See [18] for details). This method
and the tool will be used for synthesis of run-time enforcement shields in the subsequent sections.
Definition 8. A supervisor Sup realizes invariance of QDDC formula D over variables (I,O), denoted
as Sup realizes AG (D), provided L(Sup) ⊆ L(D). Recall that, by the definition of supervisors, Sup
must be non-blocking. The supervisor Sup is called maximally permissive provided for any supervisor
Sup′ such that Sup′ realizes AG (D), we have Sup ≤det Sup
′. Thus, no other supervisor with larger
languages realizes the invariance of D. This Sup is unique up to language equivalence of automata, and
the minimum state maximally permissive supervisor is denoted byMPS(D).
A well-known greatest fixed point algorithm for safety synthesis over A (D) gives usMPS(D) if it is
realizable. We omit the details here (see [18]).
Proposition 9 (MPS Monotonicity). Given QDDC formulas D1 and D2 over variables (I,O) such that
|= (D1 ⇒ D2), we have:
• MPS(D2)≤det MPS(D1), and
• If MPS(D1) is realizable then MPS(D2) is also realizable.
A DCSynth specification is a tuple (I,O,Dh,Ds) where I and O are the set of input and output vari-
ables, respectively. FormulaDh, called the hard requirement, and formula Ds, called the soft requirement,
are QDDC formulas over the set of propositions PV = I∪O. The objective in DCSynth is to synthesize
a deterministic controller which (a) invariantly satisfies the hard requirement Dh, and (b) optimally
satisfies Ds for as many inputs as possible.
The controller synthesis goes through following three stages.
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1. The DCSynth specification (I,O,Dh,Ds) is said to be realizable iff MPS(Dh) is realizable (i.e.
it exist). The synthesis method first computes the maximally permissive supervisor MPS(Dh)
realizing invariance of Dh. When clear from context we will abbreviate this asMPS.
2. A sub-supervisor of MPS(Dh) which satisfies Ds for “as many inputs as possible” is computed.
This is formalized using a notion of H-optimality w.r.t. the soft requirement Ds. We explain
this only intuitively. The reader may refer to the original paper [18] for a formal definition of
H-optimality and the synthesis algorithm. Let H be a natural number called horizon. We construct
the maximally permissive sub-supervisor of MPS(Ds), called MPHOS(Dh,Ds,H), by pruning the
non-deterministic choice of outputs in MPS and retaining only the outputs which give the highest
expected count of (intermittent) occurrence of Ds over the next H steps of execution. This count
is averaged over all input sequences of length H . A well known value-iteration algorithm due to
Bellman [1], adapted from optimal strategy synthesis for Markov Decision Processes [16], gives
us the required H-optimal maximally permissive sub-supervisor. See the paper [18] for full de-
tails which are omitted here. Note that, by construction, MPS(Dh) ≤det MPHOS(D
h,Ds,H). By
Definition 7, all the behaviours of MPHOS will invariantly satisfy Dh and the MPHOS will be
H-optimal with respect to Ds. When clear from context, MPHOS(Dh,Ds,H) will be abbreviated
asMPHOS.
3. BothMPS(Dh) and MPHOS(Dh,Ds,H) are supervisors and they may be output-nondeterministic
as there can be several optimal outputs possible. Any controller obtained by arbitrarily resolving
the output non-determinism in MPHOS(Dh,Ds,H) will also be H-optimal. In tool DCSynth, we
allow users to specify a preference ordering Ord on the set of outputs 2O. Any supervisor Sup
can be determinized by retaining only the highest ordered output among those permitted by Sup.
This is denoted by DetOrd(Sup). In tool DCSynth, the output ordering is specified by giving a
lexicographically ordered list of output variable literals, as illustrated in Example 10 below. This
facility is used to determinize supervisors MPHOS(Dh,Ds,H) and MPS(Dh) as required. These
are denoted by Detord(MPHOS(D
h,Ds,H)) and DetOrd(MPS(D
h)).
Example 10. For a supervisor Sup over variables (I,{p,q}), an output ordering can be given as list
(!q > !p), Then, the determinization step will select the highest allowed output from the list (p =
f alse,q = f alse), (p = true,q = f alse), (p = f alse,q = true), (p = true,q = true) in that order. This
choice is made for each state and each input.
In summary, given a DCSynth specification (I,O,Dh,Ds), a horizon value H and a preference or-
dering ord on outputs 2O, the tool DCSynth outputs maximally permissive supervisors MPS(Dh) and
MPHOS(Dh,Ds,H) as well as controllers DetOrd(MPS(D
h)) and Detord(MPHOS(D
h,Ds,H)).
Extended DCSynth specification: DCSynth supports the specification of soft requirements as an or-
dered list of formulas with user defined weights. This feature is used in the synthesis of run-time en-
forcement shields. The extended DCSynth specification is a tuple S = (I,O,Dh,〈Ds1 : θ1, · · · ,D
s
k : θk〉)
where I and O are sets of input and output variables respectively. The QDDC formula Dh, which is
over I ∪O, specifies the hard requirement on the controller to be synthesized. The soft requirement
〈Ds1 : θ1, · · · ,D
s
k : θk〉 is a list where each D
s
i is a QDDC formula over I∪O. θi ∈ N specifies the weight
of the soft requirement Dsi . The weight (reward) of a transition is sum of weights of each of the formula
Dsi which holds on taking the transition. The tool DCSynth produces a supervisor, which maximizes
the cumulative expected value of this reward over next H-steps of execution. This cumulative reward is
averaged over all input sequences of length H .
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3 Specification and Synthesis of Run-time Enforcement Shields
Given a correctness requirement REQ(I,O) as a QDDC formula over input-output propositions (I,O),
a system with sporadic errors (SSE) may fail to meet the requirement at some of the points in a behaviour
(ii,oo). (The reader may recall Definition 5 and its following two paragraphs for the notation.) A run-
time enforcement shield is a Mealy machine with input variables I ∪O and output variable O′. See
Figure 2. For any input (ii,oo) the shield produces a modified output oo′ such that (ii,oo′) invariantly
satisfies the correctness requirement REQ(I,O′). Moreover, the output oo′ must deviate from the SSE
output oo as little as possible to maintain quality. There are several distinct notions of “deviating as little
as possible” leading to different shields.
I SSE
O
Shield
O′
Figure 2: Run-time Enforcement Shield.
In this section, we give a logical framework for specifying various shields by using the logic QDDC.
We then provide an automatic synthesis of a run-time enforcement shield from its logical specification
using the tool DCSynth of the previous section. Thus, we achieve a logical specification and a uniform
synthesis method for shields.
Deviation constraints specify the extent of allowed deviation in a shield’s behaviour. Our specifi-
cation has hard deviation constraint HDC which must be mandatorily and invariantly satisfied by the
shield. (This is similar to the hard requirement in DCSynth.) We also define a canonical soft deviation
constraint Hamming(O,O′) which will be useful in minimizing cumulative deviation during synthesis.
Overall, a shield specification consists of a pair (REQ,HDC).
3.1 Hard Deviation Constraints
Two indicator propositions, SSEOK and Deviation play an important role in formulating hard deviation
constraints. Proposition SSEOK indicates whether the SSE is meeting the requirement REQ(I,O) at the
current position. Proposition Deviation indicates whether at the current position, the shield output is
different from the SSE output. Recall that in DCSynth specifications, the formula Ind(D,w) defines a
fresh output proposition w which is true at a position provided the past of the position satisfies formula
D (see Definition 3). We use the following list of indicator definitions in formulating hard deviation
constraints. Let, O= {o1, . . . ,or} and O
′ = {o′1, . . . ,o
′
r}.
INDDEF =
〈
Ind( REQ(I,O), SSEOK),
Ind( true^〈∨i(oi 6= o
′
i)〉, Deviation)
〉
A hard deviation constraint HDC is a QDDC formula over propositions SSEOK and Deviation. It
specifies a constraint on Deviation conditional upon the behaviour of SSEOK. In Subsection 3.4, we will
give a list of several different hard deviation constraints.
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For shield synthesis using DCSynth, we define the QDDC formula HShield given in Equation 1)
as the hard requirement over the input-output propositions (I ∪O,O′). Notice that in its formulation,
we use the cascade composition from Definition 3. This allows us to modularize the specification into
components REQ and HDC.
HShield = REQ(I,O′)∧HDC(SSEOK,Deviation)≪ INDDEF (1)
The constraint (QDDC formula) HShield must be invariantly satisfied by the shield. Tool DCSynth
gives us a maximally permissive supervisor MPS(HShield) with this property (See definition 8). This
supervisor can be termed as shield-supervisor without deviation minimization and it will be denoted by
MPS(REQ,HDC).
3.2 Soft Deviation Constraint
While HDC already places some constraints on the permitted deviation, we can further optimize the
deviation in supervisor MPS(REQ,HDC) of the previous section. Quantitative optimization techniques
from Markov Decision Processes can be used. (Stocasticity comes from the distribution of inputs to the
shield.) The tool DCSynth allows us to specify such optimization using a list of soft requirement formulas
with weights. The tool optimizes a supervisor to a sub-supervisor which maximizes the expected value
of cumulative weight of soft requirements over next H-steps. This cumulative weight is averaged over
all input sequences of length H . See Section 2.3 and [18] for further details.
We make use of this H-optimal sub-supervisor computation to get a sub-supervisor which mini-
mizes the expected cumulative deviation over next H-steps. Given the set of output propositions O =
{o1, . . . ,or}, consider the DCSynth soft-requirement
Hamming(O,O′) = 〈(true^〈o1 = o
′
1〉) : 1, . . . ,(true^〈or = o
′
r〉) : 1〉 (2)
Thus, non-deviation of any output variable oi = o
′
i at current position contributes a reward 1. This is
summed over all output variables to give weight (reward) of the soft requirement. Thus, the weight of
the soft requirement Hamming(O,O′) at any position k in a word (ii,oo,oo′) is the value (r− h) where
h is the hamming distance between oo[k] and oo′[k]. If oo and oo′ perfectly match at position k then the
weight at position k is r, whereas if oo and oo′ differ in values of say p variables at position k then the
weight at the position k is r− p.
By using Hamming(O,O′) as soft requirement and by selecting a horizon value H , we can apply the
tool DCSynth to obtain a sub-supervisor
MPHOS(MPS(REQ,HDC), Hamming(O,O′), H )
of the supervisor MPS(REQ,HDC). This sub-supervisor retains only the outputs which maximize the
expected accumulated weight of Hamming(O,O′) over next H steps in future. This supervisor is called
the shield-supervisor with deviation minimization and denoted by MPHOS(REQ,HDC,H).
3.3 Determinization
The reader must note that both the shield-supervisors MPS(REQ,HDC) and MPHOS(REQ,HDC,H)
are output non-deterministic. Multiple choice of outputs may satisfy the hard deviation constraints while
being H-optimal for the soft deviation constraint. Any arbitrary resolution of the output non-determinism
will preserve the invariance guarantees and H-optimality (see [18]).
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In our method, we allow the user to specify a preference ordering ord on the shield outputs 2O
′
. A
lexicographically ordered list of output literals is given as explained in Example 10. A deterministic
controller is obtained by retaining only the highest ordered output from the non-deterministic choice
of outputs offered by the supervisor. Thus, given a preference ordering ord we can obtain shields
(deterministic controllers) Detord(MPS(REQ,HDC)) and Detord(MPHOS(REQ,HDC,H)).
In summary, given a correctness requirement REQ(I,O) to be enforced by the shield, a hard devi-
ation constraint HDC(SSEOK,Deviation), a horizon value H (for globally minimizing the deviation
over next H steps) and a preference ordering ord on shield outputs 2O
′
, we can synthesize shields
Detord(MPS(REQ,HDC)) and Detord(MPHOS(REQ,HDC,H)). When ord,REQ,HDC,H are clear
from context, these shields are referred to as Shield NoDM (shield with no deviation minimization)
and Shield DM (shield with deviation minimization), respectively.
3.4 Variety of Hard Deviation Constraints and Shield-Types
In Table 1 below, we give a useful list of several different hard deviation constraints (HDC) as QDDC
formulas. These include the specifications of the burst-error shield of Wu et al. and the k-stabilizing
shield of Bloem et al. as well as a new notion of e,d-shield. Labels V0 to V3 are used to identify these
specifications in the experiments. Each of these HDC can be used to synthesize shields with or without
deviation minimization as explained in the previous subsection.
Table 1: Variety of Hard Deviation Constraints
ShieldType HDC
V0 Burst-shield true
V1 k-shield []([[Deviation]]=>slen<k)
V2 k-stabilizing shield []([[SSEOK && Deviation]]=>slen<k) &&
( []( (<!Deviation>^[[SSEOK]]) => [[!Deviation]] ) )
V3 e,d-shield []((scount !SSEOK <= e) => (scount Deviation <=d) &&
( []( (<!Deviation>^[[SSEOK]]) => [[!Deviation]] ) )
We provide some explanation and comments on these specifications.
• The proposition SSEOK denotes that the SSE is not making correctness error where as proposition
Deviation denotes that the shield is deviating from the SSE output. The QDDC formula
( []( (<!Deviation>^[[SSEOK]]) => [[!Deviation]] ) ) states that in any observation
interval, if the interval begins with no deviation, and there is no error by SSE during the interval,
then there is no deviation throughout the interval. This property can be called NoSpuriousDeviation.
It is included as a conjunct in k-Shield V2 as well as e,d-Shield V3.
• Burst-shield (V0) does not enforce any hard deviation constraint. Thus, only hard requirement on
the synthesized shield is to meet REQ(I ∪O,O′) invariantly. However, we can use this together
with deviation minimization using the soft deviation constraint Hamming(O,O′). By taking hori-
zon H = 0, we obtain the burst sheild of Wu et al. [21] which locally optimizes deviation at each
step without any look-ahead into the future. Larger horizon values give superior shields which im-
prove the probability of non-deviation in long run, as shown by our experiments which are reported
later in this paper.
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• A k-shield (V1) specifies (as its hard deviation constraint) that for any observation interval the
deviation can invariantly happen for at most k cycles. Thus, a burst of deviation has length of at
most k cycles. The k-shield (V1) specifies that this property must hold unconditionally. Such a
specification is often unrealizable. For example, if SSE makes consecutive errors for more than k
cycles, the shield may be forced to deviate for all of these cycles. Hence, several variants of the V1
shield have been considered.
• The k-stabilizing shield (V2) specifies that the shield may deviate as long as SSE makes errors (even
burst errors). Once SSE recovers from deviation (indicated by SSEOK becoming and remaining
true), the shield may deviate for at most k cycles. Thus, the shield must recover from deviation
within k cycles once SSEOK is established and maintained. Also, there must be no spurious
deviation due to conjunct NoSpuriousDeviation. This specification precisely gives the k-stabilizing
shield without fail-safe state, originally defined by Konighofer et al. [9]. By a variation of this, the
k-stabilizing shield with fail-safe state [9] can also be specified but we omit this here.
• We define a new notion of shield called e,d-shield (V3). This states that in any observation interval
if the count of errors by SSE (given by the term (scount !SSEOK)) is at most e then the count of
number of cycles with deviations (given by the term (scount Deviation)) is at most d. Thus
e errors lead to at most d deviations. Also, there is no spurious deviation due to the conjunct
NoSpuriousDeviation.
It may be noted that irrespective of the shield type the synthesized shield have to meet the requirement
REQ(I,O′) invariantly as specified by the formula HShield (See Equation 1).
4 Performance Measurement Metrics and Experiments
In this section we give the experimental results for shield synthesis carried out in our framework. We
first benchmark the performance of our tool and compare it with some other tools for shield synthesis
in Section 4.1. In Section 4.2 we define some performance measurement metrics for shields and we use
these to compare various shield types.
4.1 Performance of Tool DCSynth in Shield Synthesis
We have synthesized Burst-shield V0 with deviation minimization using DCSynth for all the benchmark
examples given in [21]. The results are tabulated in Table 2. All our experiments were conducted on
Linux (Ubuntu 18.04) system with Intel i5 64 bit, 2.5 GHz processor and 4 GB memory. The formula
automata files of Wu et al.[19] were used in place of QDDC formulas for uniformity. For a comparision
with other tools, the results for the k-stabilizing shield synthesis and the Burst-error shield synthesis for
the same examples are reproduced directly from Wu et al. [21]. As these are for unknown hardware
setup, a direct comparison of the synthesis times with the DCSynth synthesis times is only indicative.
As the table suggests, in most of the cases, the shield synthesized by DCSynth compares favorably
with the results reported in literature [21], both in terms of the size of the shield and the time taken for the
synthesis. Recall that DCSynth uses aggressive minimization to obtain smaller shields. As an example,
for the specification AMBA G5+6+9e64+10, our tool synthesizes a shield significantly faster and with
smaller number of states than the existing tools[2, 21].
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Table 2: Synthesis of Burst shield-V0 with Deviation Minimization optimization using DCSynth. For
each specification, the number of states of the resulting shield and time (in seconds) for synthesizing it
are reported. For comparision, results for k-stabilizing shield synthesis and Burst-error shield synthesis
are reproduced directly from Wu et al. [21].
Specification
k-Stabilizing shield Burst-error shield Burst shield V0 with DM
For H=0 For H=10
states time states time states time states time
Toyota Powertrain 38 0.2 38 0.3 9 0.07 9 0.35
Traffic light 7 0.1 7 0.2 4 0.008 4 0.059
F64p 67 0.7 67 0.5 67 0.009 67 0.029
F256p 259 46.9 259 10.5 259 0.08 259 0.09
F512p 515 509.1 515 54.4 515 0.24 515 0.26
G(¬ q) ∨ F64(q ∧ F64p) 67 0.8 67 0.6 67 0.015 67 0.06
G(¬ q) ∨ F256(q ∧ F256p) 259 46.2 259 10.7 259 0.16 259 0.27
G(¬ q) ∨ F512(q ∧ F512p) 515 571.7 515 54.5 515 0.77 515 0.91
G(q ∧ ¬ r→ (¬ r ∪4 (p ∧ ¬ r))) 15 0.1 145 0.1 6 0.002 6 0.013
G(q ∧ ¬ r→ (¬ r ∪8 (p ∧ ¬ r))) 109 0.2 5519 4.5 10 0.003 10 0.023
G(q ∧ ¬ r→ (¬ r ∪12 (p ∧ ¬ r))) 753 6.3 27338 1414.5 14 0.009 14 0.03
AMBA G1+2+3 22 0.1 22 0.1 7 0.002 7 0.01
AMBA G1+2+4 61 6.3 78 2.2 8 0.2 8 1.69
AMBA G1+3+4 231 55.6 640 97.6 14 0.25 14 2.01
AMBA G1+2+3+5 370 191.8 1405 61.8 12 0.017 13 0.105
AMBA G1+2+4+5 101 3992.9 253 472.9 12 1.27 12 8.86
AMBA G4+5+6 252 117.9 205 26.4 18 0.86 18 7.99
AMBA G5+6+10 329 9.8 396 31.4 27 3.7 27 36.14
AMBA G5+6+9e4+10 455 17.6 804 42.1 46 5.58 46 52.96
AMBA G5+6+9e8+10 739 34.9 1349 86.8 64 7.44 64 70.73
AMBA G5+6+9e16+10 1293 74.7 2420 189.7 100 11.3 100 105.2
AMBA G5+6+9e64+10 4648 1080.8 9174 2182.5 316 37.17 316 202.52
AMBA G8+9e4+10 204 7.0 254 6.1 48 0.29 16 2.13
AMBA G8+9e8+10 422 22.5 685 33.7 84 0.55 20 3.49
AMBA G8+9e16+10 830 83.7 1736 103.1 156 1.02 28 6.32
AMBA G8+9e64+10 3278 2274.2 7859 2271.5 588 5.96 76 24.89
4.2 Comparison between various shield notions
For comparing the performance of shields synthesized with different shield types, we define the following
performance metrics.
Expected Value of Non-deviation of a Shield in Long run: A shield is said to be in a non-deviating
state if the shield output O′ matches the SSE output O. A proposition !Deviation holds for such states.
We measure the probability of shield being in such states over its long runs, as described below.
Given a shield S over input-output propositions ((I∪O),O′) and a QDDC formula (regular property)
D over variables I∪O∪O′, we construct aDiscrete TimeMarkov Chain (DTMC), denoted asMuni f (S,D),
whose analysis allows us to measure the probability of D holding in long runs (steady state) of S under
independent and identically distributed (iid) inputs. This value is called the expected value of D holding
in a shield S and designated as Euni f (S,D).
The construction of the desired DTMC is as follows. The product S×A (D) gives a finite state
automaton with the same behaviours as S. Moreover, it is in accepting state exactly when D holds for the
past behaviour. (Here A (D) works as a total deterministic monitor automaton for D without restricting
S). By assigning uniform discrete probabilities to all the inputs from any state, we obtain the DTMC
Muni f (S,D) along with a designated set of accepting states. The DTMC is in accepting state precisely
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when D holds. Standard techniques from Markov chain analysis allow us to compute the probability
(Expected value) of being in the set of accepting states on long runs (steady state) of the DTMC. This
gives us the desired value Euni f (S,D). A leading probabilistic model checking tool MRMC implements
this computation [7]. In DCSynth, we provide a facility to compute Muni f (S,D) in a format accepted by
the tool MRMC. Hence, using DCSynth and MRMC, we are able to compute Euni f (S,D).
The expected value of a shield S being in a non-deviating state over long runs can be computed as
Euni f (S,true^<!Deviation>).
Worst Case Burst-Deviation Latency: The worst case burst-deviation latency gives the maximum
number of consecutive cycles for which the shield deviates even when the SSE is satisfying the require-
ment. Thus, it denotes the maximum length of an interval in the behaviour of the shield for which the
formula “SSEOK && Deviation” holds invariantly.
Given a Shield S and a QDDC formula D, the latency goal MAXLEN(D,S) computes
sup{e−b | ρ , [b,e] |= D, ρ ∈ Exec(S)}
i. e. it computes the length of the longest interval satisfying D across all the executions of S. Thus, it
computes the worst case span of behaviour fragments matching D in S. Tool CTLDC [14] implements
a model checking technique for computing MAXLEN(D,S). The worst case burst deviation latency of
shield measures the maximum number of consecutive cycles having deviation in worst case. The worst
case burst-deviation latency of a shield S can be computed as MAXLEN([[SSEOK && Deviation]],S).
4.2.1 Experiments and Findings
We can use the expected value of deviation and the worst case burst-deviation latency, defined above,
for comparing the shields obtained using various shield-types defined in Section 3.4. We synthesized
various shields for the correctness requirement ϕuntil(n) given in Example 1 with n = 5 and the input-
output propositions ({r},{p,q}). The output propositions of synthesized shield are {p′,q′}. For each
shield type Vi given in Table 1, the deterministic shields Vi NoDM and Vi DM were synthesized as
outlined in the last paragraph of Section 3.3. HereVi NoDM denotes shield synthesized without deviation
minimization where asVi DM denotes the shield obtained with deviation minimization optimization. The
shield-supervisors were determinized with the preference ordering (!q′ >!p′) on outputs.
Table 3 gives the results obtained. We report the number of states of the shield along with the
time taken (in seconds) by the tool DCSynth to compute the shield. Moreover, for comparing the per-
formance of the resulting shields, their Expected Value of non-deviation as well as the worst case
burst-deviation latency are reported in the table under the columns titled Expected Value and Latency,
respectively.
It is observed that with deviation minimization optimization, several different shield types resulted in
identical shields, although the time to synthesize them differed. For example, shields in rows numbered
10 to 15 are identical. We indicate such a situation by merging the corresponding rows to a single cell.
We give our findings below.
• The k-shield (V1) is unrealizable as expected. See its description in Section 3.4 for an explanation.
All the other shield types are found to be realizable.
• For shield synthesis without deviation minimization, we obtain distinct shields with distinct per-
formance for each shield type. The Burst shield (V0) has the poorest performance (expected non-
deviation 0.25 and latency ∞) as it enforces trivial hard deviation requirement true. The best
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Table 3: Shield Synthesis for the formula ϕuntil(5) of Example 1 with various shield types defined in
Table 1 and their Performance comparison. The expected value of non-deviation in long run and the
worst case burst-deviation latency are reported.
Sr. No. Shield Type States Time Expected Value Latency
Shield Synthesis of Requirement ϕuntil(5)Without Deviation Minimization
1. V0 NoDM 18 0.004 0.25 ∞
2. V1 NoDM(k=1) Unrealizable
3. V2 NoDM(k=1) 14 0.004 0.7142793 1
4. V1 NoDM(k=3) Unrealizable
5. V2 NoDM(k=3) 18 0.009 0.5982051 3
6. V3 NoDM(e=1,d=1) 13 0.001 0.7499943 0
7. V3 NoDM(e=1,d=2) 26 0.005 0.7182475 1
8. V3 NoDM(e=1,d=3) 40 0.008 0.6614611 2
Shield Synthesis of Requirement ϕuntil(5)With Deviation Minimization
9. V1 DM(k=1) Unrealizable
10. V0 DM(H=0)
13
0.003
0.833252 0
11. V2 DM(k=1)(H=0) 0.005
12. V2 DM(k=3)(H=0) 0.006
13. V3 DM(e=1,d=1)(H=0) 0.004
14. V3 DM(e=1,d=2)(H=0) 0.005
15. V3 DM(e=1,d=3)(H=0) 0.004
16. V0 DM(H=10)
8
0.016
0.8571396 0
17. V2 DM(k=1)(H=10) 0.01
18. V2 DM(k=3)(H=10) 0.009
19. V3 DM(e=1,d=1)(H=10) 0.008
20. V3 DM(e=1,d=2)(H=10) 0.012
21. V3 DM(e=1,d=3)(H=10) 0.013
performance is obtained for the newly defined e,d-shield type V3 by choosing e = d. This gives
0.74 as the expected value of non-deviation and worst case latency of 0 cycles. With increased
difference d− e the performance degrades. Similarly in k-stabilizing shield (V2) the performance
degrades with increase in the value of k, as expected.
• The performance of the shield considerably improves with the deviation minimization (DM) opti-
mization. Expected value of 0.85 compares well against the best value of 0.74 without deviation
minimization. Also burst-deviation latency drops to 0 with DM. We also notice that the perfor-
mance improves with increase in the horizon value when using DM. This is intuitively clear as
the tool performs global optimization across larger number of steps of look-ahead with increased
horizon.
• For shield synthesis with deviation minimization optimization, all the different shield typesV0,V2,V3
resulted in identical shield for a given value of horizon H . Thus shields in rows 10-15 (synthesized
with H = 0) and rows 16-21 (synthesized with H = 10) are found to be identical. This shows that
deviation minimization effectively supersedes the different hard deviation guarantees provided by
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the HDC. While this is not theoretically guaranteed, our experience with robust controller synthe-
sis also indicates the overwhelming effectiveness of the DM-like optimization [15].
5 Discussion and Related Work
In this paper we have presented a logical framework for specifying error-correcting run-time enforce-
ment shields using formulas of logic QDDC. The specification contains a correctness requirement REQ,
specifying the desired input-output relation to be maintained, as well as a hard deviation constraint HDC
which specifies a constraint on deviation between the system output and the shield output. Our shield
synthesis gives a shield which invariantly satisfies both REQ and HDC. Moreover, a powerful optimiza-
tion globally minimizes the cumulative deviation between the system and the shield output.
The idea of error-correcting run-time enforcement shield was proposed in the pioneering work of
Bloem et al. [2], where the notion of k-stabilizing shield (with a synthesis algorithm) was proposed. This
was further enhanced by Konighofer et al. [9]. Extension of shield synthesis to liveness properties has
also been explored in this paper. Wu et al. [21, 20] defined the burst shield which is capable of handling
burst errors. Moreover, they proposed optimizing the shield with the choice of output which locally
minimizes the deviation at each stage. In this paper, we have enhanced this with global optimization of
cumulative deviation across next H steps.
In our method, the shield is logically specified using QDDC formulas and a uniform method for the
synthesis of the shield is proposed. A tool DCSynth implements the synthesis method. Logic QDDC
[13, 12, 11] with its interval logic modalities, threshold counting constraints, regular expression like
constructs and second-order quantification over temporal variables provides a very rich vocabulary to
specify both the system requirements and the deviation constraints. Logic QDDC is a discrete time
version of Duration Calculus proposed by Zhou, Hoare and Ravn [5, 4] with known automata theoretic
decision and model checking procedures [13, 3, 17, 10]. Using the proposed technique, we have specified
the k-stabilizing shield of Konighofer et al. [9], the burst shield of Wu et al. [21, 20], as well as a new e,d-
shield. Moreover, we have measured the performance of the shields resulting from these different criteria
in terms of the expected value of deviation in long runs, as well as the worst case burst deviation latency.
Our experiments show an overwhelming impact of global deviation minimization on the quality of the
shield. At the same time, hard deviation constraints provide a conditional hard guarantee on the worst
case deviation. Hence, the combination of hard deviation constraint together with global minimization
of deviation is useful.
Konighofer et al. [9] as well as Ehlers and Topku [6] propose controller/shield synthesis technique
for optimal achievable value of parameter k in a regular specification. By contrast, our current method
requires k to be specified. In our future work, we will address similar optimal parametric synthesis from
parameterized QDDC specifications.
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